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Abstract: In this paper we address the measurement and the analysis of credibility in fiscal policy. 
In many instances fiscal policy as conducted by governments is not perceived as credible, because the 
targets set forward by the government are often not met. Usually the divergence is on the negative side. 
Taxes are overestimated and spending is underestimated, leading to a deficit bias and growing 
indebtedness of governments. This paper focuses on a measure of credibility that builds on the 
deviations of the actual budget balances from the projections about these balances in the preceding year 
for 26 EU member states over the period 1999-2009.1 The objective is to extract from these data 
insights into the credibility of these governments’ fiscal policies and to explain credibility by a number 
of political determinants. 
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1. Introduction 
 
As the recent problems of countries like Greece, Portugal, Ireland, Italy and Spain in 
containing the deficit and the growth of public debt show, a lack of credibility in the 
eyes of the financial markets can lead to a domino effect which can also infect other 
countries and which even can put a major currency under speculative pressure. The 
crisis in the euro zone thus put the credibility question of fiscal policies to the 
                                                 
1  In November 2009, it was revealed that Greece had manipulated its balance sheets prior in order to 
hide its debt. Therefore we have removed the figures of  Greece from our dataset. Our analyses will 
contain data of  the 26 EU remaining member states. 
Naert & Goeminne 2 
foreground. The new Directive on requirements for budgetary frameworks of the 
Member States included in the “Six Pack” that was recently adopted by the European 
Parliament and the Council  refers to the credibility question too. Budgetary forecasts 
for fiscal planning will be subject to ex post evaluation of which the result shall be 
made public and taken into account appropriately in future budgetary forecasts.  
 
In this paper we analyse the concept of credibility in general and provide an overview 
of the literature about credibility of fiscal policies. This paper looks at the divergences 
between the actual government budget balances of the EU member states and what 
these governments‟ targets were for the balance. First, we use these data to construct 
indicators for the credibility of fiscal policies and derive some insights into credibility 
from these indicators. Second, we expand the analysis with an econometric model to 
discover the driving forces of the divergence between the actual and projected budget 
balances. The focus of that extended analysis will be on political determinants. 
 
2. Credibility in general 
 
As the following examples show, credibility is a crucial factor of any government 
policy. A government may announce a final regularisation of illegal asylum seekers but 
looses credibility if it subsequently announces another regularisation. The next influx 
of asylum seekers may be the result. The same is true for a government announcing a 
final tax amnesty in order to encourage re-imports of capital followed by the 
announcement of another amnesty program. The first program will not attain its 
objective and the credibility of the policy will be undermined. As a result capital will 
continue to avoid taxes. The monetary policy of another government may attempt to 
fight against inflation in the aftermath of elections, still if the government forgets 
about its intentions when the next election draws nearer, it will lose its credibility. 
Consequently, economic actors may base their decisions on high inflation 
expectations. Finally, in regulatory policy a government setting rules to attract 
investors in some network industry, can drive investors out by changing the rules and 
so hurting those investors. Lack of credibility will be the cause of suboptimal 
investment. 
 
The World Bank (2005; 66) suggests that budget credibility improves the  allocation 
of resources. A lack of credibility in the budget may lead to short-falls in the funding 
of priority expenditures. In fiscal policy, credibility is thus equally important. 
Announcing a target for spending, taxing, balance or debt and then ending up 
somewhere else will influence the behaviour of the actors that receive government 
funds, pay taxes, hold government bonds,… They will act in accordance with the real 
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conduct of policy in terms of saving, spending, producing, instead of with the 
announced targets. A specific aspect of this question is when investors lose their 
belief in the creditworthiness of governments that systematically fail to reach their 
deficit targets and accumulate unforeseen debt that probably cannot be repaid in the 
future. 
 
The problem of credibility of government policy has been framed as the problem of 
time inconsistency by Kydland & Prescott (1977). Doing something at t1 that differs 
from what the government announced at t0 about its plans for t1 is the root of the 
problem. Leaning towards rules instead of towards discretion was the obvious 
solution to this problem. This means that a government has to abstain from 
discretionary decision making and has to govern by rules that are fixed a priori and are 
clear to the public. A further step is to hand over policy making to institutions that 
can operate independently, at arm‟s length, from elected politicians. Independent 
central banks and regulators were, consequently, set up at the speed of light during the 
last decennia all over the world. 
 
Recall that the central idea behind all this was credibility, or the lack of it. Credibility is 
the capacity for inspiring belief. A credible policy is a policy worthy of being accepted 
as true or reasonable. A government is credible when agents believe it will fulfil it 
promises (Naert, 2011). Notwithstanding the central place of credibility, there have 
not been many attempts to measure credibility directly. It is crucial but it is usually set 
aside to focus on rules and independence (see Beetsma et al., 2010 for an example). 
 
The input for the paper comes from the Stability and Convergence Programmes that 
European Union member states have to submit yearly to the European Commission. 
In these programmes member states have to lay down a path of future budget 
balances for the next 3 to 5 years next to a historical record for evaluation.  Ex-post 
these targets can be compared with the actual budget balances and the difference 
between these two figures reveals information about the crucial aspect of credibility: 
the degree to which an announced policy has actually been carried out. Indeed, a lack 
of credibility increases the likelihood of overshooting the deficit target that may arise 
from e.g. over-optimistic revenue forecasts, under-budgeting of non-discretionary 
expenditures, non-compliance in budget execution,... (World Bank, 2005).  
 
The ambition of this paper is twofold. First, we will quantify credibility and extract 
information on its evolution and the relative position of governments. This 
qualification is restricted to a descriptive and graphical approach. Second, we will run 
some regressions that explain the level of credibility of EU member states.   
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3. Credibility in the literature 
 
Definitions of credibility in the literature are scarce. According to Baxter (1985) 
“credibility is defined to be the subjective probability, as assessed by agents in the 
economy, that a reform has in fact taken place.” Hauner et al. (2007) have it that 
“standard models of policy credibility (Drazen & Masson, 1994; Dornbusch, 1991) 
define it as the expectation that an announced policy will be carried out”. Usually the 
concept of credibility further remains unquantified. Jacobs (2010) e.g. starts from the 
time inconsistency approach of Kydland & Prescott (1977), but subsequently turns to 
anecdotal proof for explaining what is credible and incredible policy. In the same vein 
IMF (2010) regularly mentions „credibility‟ but never defines nor quantifies it. 
According to Tavares (2004) credibility means the persistence, the success of fiscal 
adjustments. 
 
Next to the literature on credibility, the literature on the track record of the Stability 
and Convergence Programmes is relevant for this paper. Different papers focus on 
the accuracy of deficit projections. Artis & Marcellino (2001) analyse the relative 
performance of some EU member states in forecasting the government deficit as a 
ratio to GDP. Poplawski-Ribeiro & Rülke (2010) focus on the forecasting abilities of 
financial market experts on fiscal policies and the impact on these abilities of the 
introduction of the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) to introduce their definition of 
credibility, i.e. the convergence of the forecasts on budget balances by financial 
experts and by governments (Commission and member states). The accuracy of the 
data in the Stability and Convergence Programmes is also the subject of the papers by 
Annett (2006),  Beetsma et al. (2009), Brück & Stephan (2006), Pina & Venes (2011), 
Strauch et al. (2004) and Van Meensel & Dury (2008).2 Annett (2006) studied forecast 
errors under stability programs for the period 1999-2004 for 12 EU member states. 
Beetsma et al. (2009) explore the factors determining fiscal policy in 14 EU countries 
in its different fiscal policy making stages over the period 1998-2007. Brück & 
Stephan (2006) assess the political, electoral and institutional determinants of the 
quality of the budget deficit forecasts for euro zone countries before and after the 
introduction of the SGP. Pina & Venes (2011) compare the balance forecasts over 
the period 1994-2007 prepared by the 15 countries belonging to the EU before the 
2004 enlargement in their Excessive Deficit Procedure reportings with the actual 
balances. For the 15 old member states Van Meensel & Dury (2008) report, without 
much further comment, the average difference between the actual budget balance of 
                                                 
2  Also the EC includes since a couple of  years in it‟s assessment of  national programmes a graph 
confronting the objectives and the actual balances, without further comments. 
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governments in one year in % of GDP and the projection of the balance for this year 
in the previous year. Strauch et al. (2004) work with the data from the Stability and 
Convergence Programmes over the period 1991-2002 from a forecasting perspective 
on growth and the budget balance. They use descriptive statistics to assess the quality 
of forecasts and to explain the qualitative differences in forecasts and is related to the 
work of Keereman (1999) and Jonung & Larch (2006). Strauch et al. (2004) firstly 
focus on the variance of forecast biases. Cautious as well as optimistic biases are 
found in different countries. Furthermore governments do not seem to use the 
available information efficiently to minimise the forecast errors of their projections. 
Their second exercise points at the cyclical position of the economy and the form of 
fiscal governance as the important determinants for the quality of forecasts. Our 
paper fits closely into the first part of the Strauch et al. (2004) approach and into the 
recent work of Pina & Venes (2011). The differences are threefold. The data we use 
cover all EU member states (except for Greece, see footnote 1). Secondly we cover 
larger time periods: the period 1999-2009 for the „old‟ member states, the period 
2004-2009 for the 10 member states that joined in May 2004 and 2007-2009 for 
Romania and Bulgaria. The third distinction is that the focus in our paper is not on 
forecasting quality but on the credibility aspect of the budgetary plans made in the 
country programmes. Pina & Venes (2011) also use EDP data which are less useful 
for explaining credibility since EDP forecasts are made (twice) in the current year.  
 
4. Credibility and projection of budget balances 
 
According to the definition of credibility put forward by Baxter (1985) and Hauner et 
al. (2007), credibility is the idea living in the minds of market agents about how close 
the results of a policy will be to the announced policy. This idea is formed at a point 
in time when only the information on the announced policy is available, while the 
results of the policy are situated in the future. The comparison of the fiscal policy 
plans that governments of member states put forward in their Stability and 
Convergence Programmes and the actual budget balances can therefore teach us 
something about the credibility of their fiscal policy. The focus of this paper will be 
on the difference between the actual budget balance and the planned budget balance. 
This is in line with the idea of the World Bank (2005; 2) that states that a budget is 
credible if “it is realistic and implemented as intended”. 
 
A matter of discussion is the meaning and the intention of the projections in Stability 
and Convergence Programmes. As Strauch et al. (2004) put it “the objective of this 
paper raises the issue as to whether the projections in programmes are intended to be 
unconditional forecasts or rather the announcement of a political target”. In the case 
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that programme projections are interpreted solely as forecasts two other assumptions 
can be made.  The first assumption is that the projection is the result of a purely a-
political statistical exercise. In that case deviations from the projection are also a-
political in nature and the causes should be searched in factors such as the business 
cycle or economic shocks. As a consequence the concept of credibility is not involved 
here. In the second assumption one can suspect the authors to manipulate their 
projections for political reasons.  Indeed, governments may use optimistic projections 
strategically and as Jonung & Larch (2006) show, these optimistic forecasts have 
systematically affected the budgetary position of the EU member states. Such 
optimism gives another meaning to deviations from programme projections. Besides 
being the result of shocks or the business cycle, they thus can be political in nature 
and can offer an alibi for avoiding politically risky and costly reforms. Credibility thus 
is involved here, in a sense that the projection is unrealistic and as a consequence 
policy must fail to meet the projection. 
 
Credibility is also involved when the projection is clearly stated as a political target 
that the government vows to pursue. In a strict sense a deviation from the target can 
always be avoided by government, since even severe adverse shocks with negative 
effects on the budget balance can always be countered by a change in budgetary 
policy. This rather theoretical situation can however act as the yardstick for perfect 
credibility of fiscal policy, i.e. a situation in which there is no deviation between target 
and actual balance. In this paper we assume that budgetary projections have to be 
regarded as the announcements of a political target, deviations from which affect the 
credibility of fiscal policy.  
 
5. The statistics 
 
Assessing the quality of targeting can be done using a multitude of techniques. Firstly  
a qualitative indication of targeting accuracy can be given by presenting some 
descriptive statistics and by applying a graphical analysis. This method has the 
advantage of being straightforward; still it does not permit to test the statistical 
significance of the results.  
 
5.1 The data  
 
Analogously to Annett (2006), Beetsma et al. (2009), Moulin & Wierts (2006), Strauch 
et al. (2004) and Von Hagen (2010) we extract the data from the Stability or 
Convergence Programmes that EU-members put down before the European Union. 
Our dataset consists of data for the period 1999-2009. All over there were 231 such 
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programmes submitted to the EU (including Greece). The „old‟ member states 
submitted 11, the member states that acceded in 2004 submitted 6 and Bulgaria and 
Romania each 3.  
 
The year t targeting error of EU member i (Ei,t) is the difference between its actual 
budget balance in year t (Ai,t) in % of GDP , and its planned budget balance for year t 
in t-1 (Pi,t). The targeting error Ei,t is the simplest way of measuring credibility and is 
calculated as:  
 
Ei,t = Ai,t – Pi,t 
 
Pi,t is the most recent target of the budget balance of the following fiscal year t.   
Nevertheless, for each programme governments made projections and forecasts for 
on average 4 years. These data can be used to calculate the mean error (ME) between 
planned and actual budget balance. For each country the average difference was 
calculated between the actual outcome for that year and the several targets or 
projections, or thus ; 
 
ME =  
 
The mean error (ME) provides information on the difference between the actual  
outcome and the average forecasts or projections. ME gives only a first impression of 
the quality of the different forecasts as positive and negative errors can offset each 
other. The size of the error thus is reduced. To tackle this, one can calculate the mean 
absolute error (MAE). The MAE measures the average magnitude of the errors of the 
forecasts, without considering their direction. MAE is calculated as following : 
 
MAE =  
 
Finally, we calculate the root mean squared errors (RMSE) to capture that large 
differences between forecasts and outcomes are more harmful than small errors.  
RMSE penalises large mistakes more than MAE. RMSE has the same dimension as 
MAE, yet the larger the standard deviation of the differences, the more the RMSE will 
be above the MAE. Comparing both figures allows interpreting the relative size of the 
error. A strong difference between MAE and RMSE suggests large errors in certain 
years. RSME is calculated as following : 
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RSME =  
 
We consider E and ME as our primary indicators of credibility since they give us the 
more direct information on how well the budgetary targets are achieved. MAE and 
RSME are secondary measures as they give additional information as regarding the 
direction and size of the deviations from the targets. The values of the primary 
indicators reveal information on credibility in the sense that the further away from 
zero the less credibility is involved. The primary indicators become more relevant in a 
relative sense, i.e. when comparisons are made over time and between countries. 
 
5.2 General results 
 
Following standard practice in the forecast evaluation literature, Table 1 presents the 
essential information on the size of the targeting mistake by providing error (E), 
mean error (ME), mean absolute error (MEA) and root mean squared error (RSME) 
of the budget balance. Irrespective of the size of the errors, targeting mistakes  
should be unbiased. They should not be systematically too optimistic or too 
pessimistic, implying that positive and negative errors should offset out each other on 
average. Yet, for all 26 countries taken together the budget balance turned out to be 
on average 0,31% of GDP worse than projected in the previous year (E), thus 
meaning that governments on average do overestimate the budget balance for the 
next year. When comparing E and ME, which stands at 2,00, we see as expected that 
the error increases with the years the forecasts are made in advance.  
 
Table 1 E, ME, MAE & RSME of the budget balance forecast error (26 EU members, 
1999-2009) 
 
E -0,31 
ME -0,70 
MAE 2,00 
RSME 2,88 
 
The value of MAE is 2,00 % of GDP, pointing at the fact that the deviations from 
the target are not restricted to negatives only.  Indeed an absolute deviation of 2,00 % 
seems to be quite considerable. Given a RSME of 2,88 the deviations seem to be of a 
rather equal magnitude revealing that the other measures do not result from a 
combination of a few large deviations and a lot of small ones. 
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5.3 Evolution over time 
 
If we look at the evolution of the deviations of actual balances (E and ME) from the 
projections and forecasts over the period 1999-2009 (Figure 1) we see that the 
average overestimation of the budget balance is mostly due to the crisis years 2008 
and 2009. In six out of eleven years the E-indicator shows a positive sign however. 
The ME-indicator scores worse with seven negative outcomes.  About a decade ago, 
the European Commission (2002) stated a divergence between budgetary 
commitments taken by member states in their Stability and Convergence Programme 
and their actual implementation. Our recent figures thus show that the evidence since 
then is mixed. Figure 1 moreover indicates a strong correlation between the 
credibility measures and real GDP growth. When growth accelerates (slows down) 
credibility improves (worsens). This acceleration is usually not fully forecasted by 
governments, leading to a better than targeted budget balance. A slowing down of 
growth is equally not foreseen by governments making their actual budget balances 
seem worse than the targeted balances.  
 
Figure 1 Evolution of E, ME & real gdp growth (26 EU members, 1999-2009)  
 
 
5.4 Average results per country 
 
In Table 2 and Figure 2 we find the results per EU member state. These results vary 
between an E of -2,9% of GDP in Bulgaria and an E of +1,9% of GDP in 
Luxembourg. The budget balance of Bulgaria thus situates itself on average 2,9% of 
GDP below the projections that the Bulgarian government made in the preceding 
year. The MAE indicates that this deviation is the result of a systematic 
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overestimation of the budget (in the sense that a projection of -1% is an 
overestimation of 2% if the actual budget balance ends up at -3%). The Bulgarian 
government thus is underachieving compared to the objectives it set for itself in the 
previous year. Put in another way, the Bulgarian government does not exhibit a lot of 
credibility as concerns its fiscal policy. The other extreme is Luxembourg. The budget 
balance in Luxembourg was on average 1,9% of GDP better that planned. The 
question then is what this means for credibility. Credibility is the extent to which a 
government does what it had previously said it would be doing. Is this a symmetric 
concept? Does fiscal policy become less credible when the results of the policy are 
better than projected? In our view this is an unsustainable premise. Governments that 
do better than planned do not as a consequence suffer from a drop of credibility. It 
could be tempting to anchor credibility around the 0% benchmark. However, we 
prefer to work with a full linear measure: the higher the figure the higher the 
credibility.  
 
Proceeding on this route we identify a gap of 0,8% between Bulgaria and the second 
worst scoring country Romania. This country scores an E of -2,1% . A third group of 
countries have scores that range between -1,2% and -0,7% : Poland, Portugal, 
Lithuania, Latvia, Spain, Italy, Hungary, Malta and France.  The next range is between 
-0,5% and -0,3% with countries such as the UK, Belgium, Austria, Ireland, the 
Netherlands and Sweden. Denmark, Slovenia, Germany, Estonia, Cyprus and Finland  
find themselves in a range of +0,1% to +0,4%. The Czech Republic scores very well 
with +0,7% and finally Luxembourg is at +1,9%. 
 
Table 2 Average results per country (1999-2009) 
 
 E ME MAE RSME 
Austria -0,3 -0,6 1,0 1,7 
Belgium -0,5 -0,9 1,3 2,2 
Bulgaria -2,9 -2,5 2,8 5,1 
Cyprus 0,4 0,5 2,4 3,7 
Czech Republic 0,7 0,7 1,8 2,2 
Denmark 0,1 -0,1 1,9 2,4 
Estonia 0,3 0,3 2,1 2,5 
Finland 0,4 0,4 1,9 2,5 
France -0,7 -1,5 1,6 2,6 
Germany 0,2 -0,5 1,8 2,2 
Hungary -0,8 -1,9 2,4 2,7 
Ireland -0,3 -0,9 3,5 5,0 
Italy -0,8 -1,6 1,9 2,4 
Latvia -0,9 -1,2 2,9 4,4 
Lithuania -1,0 -1,1 2,7 4,0 
Luxembourg 1,9 1,5 2,4 2,8 
Malta -0,8 -1,1 1,5 2,2 
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Netherlands -0,3 -0,3 2,0 2,5 
Poland -1,2 -1,3 1,5 2,6 
Portugal -1,1 -2,2 2,3 3,2 
Romania -2,1 -2,7 2,8 4,2 
Slovakia -0,3 -0,6 1,5 2,5 
Slovenia 0,1 -0,4 1,1 1,9 
Spain -0,9 -1,1 1,9 3,4 
Sweden -0,3 -0,2 1,9 2,3 
United Kingdom -0,5 -1,4 2,2 2,9 
EU-26 -0,3 -0,7 2,0 2,9 
EU-14 -0,2 -0,7 2,0 2,8 
EU-10 -0,3 -0,6 2,0 3,0 
EU-2 -2,5 -2,6 2,8 4,7 
Eurozone -0,2 -0,6 1,9 2,8 
Non-eurozone -0,8 -0,8 2,2 3,0 
 
 
There is a difference between the deviations in the eurozone group (-0,2% of GDP) 
en de non-eurozone group (-0,8% of GDP). The 10 member states (-0,3%) that 
joined in 2004 score the same as the older member states (-0,2%). The 2 new 
member states since 2007 are scoring significantly worse (-2,5%) than the other 
members. 
 
When looking also at MAE and RSME we see that the two countries at the bad end 
of the E-ranking are now joined by Ireland and Latvia. The bad MAE score of 
Ireland strongly deviates from the E-indicator, pointing at strong deviations, 
influenced by an exceptional year 2009  as shown by the high RSME.  
 
For the countries that score an ME around 0 (Denmark, Slovenia, Germany, Estonia, 
Cyprus and Finland) it stands out that this good score coincides with an MAE that 
strongly deviates from E (except for Slovenia), pointing at symmetry in the 
deviations. Only for Cyprus do exceptional circumstances seem to be important (high 
RSME). 
 
Naert & Goeminne 12 
Figure 2 A measure of credibility of fiscal policies in the EU (26 EU members, 1999-
2009) 
 
 
 
What does the observation of MAE and MRSE mean for the credibility question? 
Two countries can have the same ME, but in the one case this can be result of a 
history of low deviations combined with some outliers, while in the other case the 
same ME can result from systematic high deviations. It seems to us that exceptional 
circumstances erode credibility less than a systematic failure in reaching preset targets. 
 
6. Explaining differences in credibility 
 
The first aim of this paper is to characterize and to measure credibility in fiscal policy. 
We provided above a first assessment of the level of credibility of the EU member 
states. It is clear from this first analyses that there is strong variation of biases across 
EU member states. The second step is to explain these cross country differences in 
credibility.  
 
First, the fact whether or not the announced policy is carried out may reflect the 
government‟s ability and willingness to make adequate assessments of their future 
fiscal policy. There is a literature that points to the influence of the technical aspects 
of the budgeting process and explores the effect of, for example, using „expert‟ 
judgements rather than more advanced econometric techniques to make forecasts 
(Bretschneider et al., 1989 or Voorhees, 2004), of the level of politicians‟ risk aversion 
when faced with uncertainty in the forecasting process (Rubin, 1987) or of the role of 
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independent fiscal agencies could be assessed (Jonung & Larch, 2006). Second, the 
economic environment may have an impact whether or not the government succeeds 
in carrying out its projected policy (Strauch et al., 2004). Figure 1 shows that the 
business cycle fundamentally affects the divergences between projected and effective 
results. But even after discounting for technical aspects and for the business cycle, 
budgetary policy may still struggle with credibility. In fact, also political-institutional 
characteristics of the governments may affect (or incite) the policy‟s credibility. 
Indeed, critics of the SGP point to its weak mechanisms to prevent politically-
motivated policies (Buti & Van den Noord, 2003). E.g. Tavares (2004) describes 
credibility as the persistence, the success of fiscal adjustments and then analyses the 
factors that determine this success. He finds proof for the thesis that leftist 
governments are more credible when they reduce spending and rightist when they 
raise taxes. So the ideological stance of governments should be taken into account, as 
well as the political fragmentation of the government. Goeminne et al. (2008) find 
that the level of tax revenues pocketed by a government during the fiscal year often 
deviates from that projected by this government in its budget. When explaining the  
degree of deviation, they find that it is affected by the level of political fragmentation. 
Also the effect of elections may not be underestimated. When elections come near, 
uncertain incumbents in particular will try to attract votes to guarantee their re-
election. Therefore it would not be surprising if fiscal policy is electorally manipulated 
by means of biased projections, as the theory of the electoral budget cycles suggest. 
Also Beetsma et al. (2009), Brück & Stephan (2006) and Pina & Venes (2011) point to 
politico-institutional determinants of fiscal forecasts. In the next section we test 
possible political reasons that may explain the level of credibility. Therefore we will 
run regressions that explain credibility by a number of political variables, 
supplemented with a number of control variables.  
 
7. The model 
 
The most natural way to assess econometrically the impact of politics on credibility is 
to introduce a number of political variables into a model of fiscal behaviour and 
check whether the estimated coefficients are both quantitatively meaningful and 
statistically significant. We thus run a regression that explains credibility by a number 
of political variables, while economic and institutional determinants will be added as 
control variables.  
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We formulate the following regression model for credibility : 
 
Ei,t = α0+α1 POLi,t-1+α2 ECONi,t+α3 INSTITUTi,t+α4 CRISISt+α5 MEMBERSi+vt  
 
were vt is the error term.  
 
The dependent variable Ei,t thus is the difference between the actual budget balance 
in year t (Ai,t) and the planned budget balance for year t in t-1 (Pi,t) and is analogously 
defined as the dependent variable in Annet (2006) and Pina & Venes (2011).3 Both 
Ai,t and Pi,t are expressed in % of GDP. Positive values of Ei,t mean a better than 
projected policy execution, yielding a higher surplus or a lower deficit. Negative 
values indicate that governments achieved a result that was worse than projected, or 
that forecasts were optimistic, that is an underestimation of the deficit or an 
overestimation of the surplus. Figure 1 demonstrated that E and ME follow  similar 
trends. Indeed, there is a strong correlation of 0,92 between E and ME. Yet we 
choose E above ME as the dependent variable for credibility. The latter takes into 
account projections that may have lost value because e.g. the government was 
changed, the economic situation has turned suddenly or institutional parameters have 
been changed since the first projections were made. In explaining Ei,t  we use the data 
that are as close as possible to the information sets of the policy-makers when they 
form their plans and when they implement their actual policies.  We thus explain the 
difference between the actual budget balance and the targeted budget balance when 
preparing the final budget. The importance of the budget is stressed by OECD 
(2002) when they state that the budget is the single most important policy document 
of governments, where policy objectives are reconciled and implemented in concrete 
terms. Indeed, in the budget, the government, given its characteristics and known 
circumstances, formulates its final projection. In that senses, only the difference 
between the final outturn and the final forecast can be used to explain the credibility 
of a government.  
 
POL groups the political variables that are retrieved from the Armingeon et al. (2011) 
Comparative Political Data Set III 1990-2009. This is a collection of political and 
institutional data which consists of annual data for EU-member countries for the 
period 1990-2009. First, the ideological position of the government may explain 
differences in credibility. Hibbs (1977), and subsequently Tufte (1978), introduced the 
idea that ideological differences may play an important role in shaping policy. The 
left-right position of a government thus could affect credibility. Brück & Stephan 
                                                 
3  Beetsma et al. (2009) and Brück & Stephan (2006) construct their forecast error as the predicted value 
minus the actual value. 
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(2006) hypothesise that leftist governments pursue employment at the expense of 
price stability. The opposite is expected for rightist governments. A leftist 
government may be too optimistic about employment and hence overestimate 
income tax revenue and thus also the budget balance. To test the argument that left-
wing and right-wing cabinets may differ in credibility, ideological variables are 
introduced that control for the orientation of the main parties of the governing 
coalition along the right/left axis. We introduce two dummy variables LEFT and 
RIGHT. LEFT takes value 1 if social-democratic and other left-wing parties 
dominate the government, that is when they have at least 66,66% of the 
parliamentary seats (weighted by the number of days the government was in office in 
a given year) and value 0 if other. A negative sign may be expected. RIGHT is created 
analogous for right-wing parties dominating the government.4 Here a positive sign is 
expected. The remaining category is when neither rightist nor leftist parties dominate 
the government.  
 
Second, the fragmentation of governments may explain credibility. Roubini & Sachs 
(1989a & 1989b) and Grilli et al. (1991) show empirically that coalition cabinets tend 
to be more fiscally irresponsible. They present empirical evidence of the Weak 
Government Hypothesis. This theory predicts that more fragmented governments 
follow less restrictive fiscal policies leading to higher levels of expenditures as well as 
higher debts and deficits. To finance this higher spendthrift, fragmented governments 
require more revenues and may therefore be tempted to increase their financial 
leeway by being more optimistic in their projections (Voorhees, 2004), leading to a 
lower degree of credibility.5 Also the War of Attrition model (Alesina & Drazen, 
1991) may explain why the governments‟ fragmentation may affect credibility. We 
illustrate this using the following example. In the event of an (exogenous) shock that 
deteriorates the government‟s budgetary situation, a stabilization process will be 
initiated in which each group of the coalition attempts to wait the others out. The 
reason is that waiting until the others capitulate allows a party to pass the largest part 
of the negative effects of the stabilization effort to the other parties. The lower the 
degree of political cohesion (or, the more fragmented the government), the later is 
the expected date of stabilization (Martinelli & Escorza, 2007) and the more difficult 
                                                 
4  Right-wing parties dominate the government when they have at least 66,66% of  the parliamentary seats 
(weighted by the number of  days the government was in office in a given year). 
5  Remark that we do not impose an explicit objective by fragmented governments to consciously 
overestimate revenues, i.e. we do not assume a desire for deficits in fragmented governments. The 
politicians drafting the budget may well believe in achieving their goals. Indeed, the „cognitive 
dissonance‟ literature argues that people have preferences over their states of beliefs and select sources 
of information to confirm these „desired beliefs‟ (see e.g. Akerlof & Dickens, 1982). In other words, 
people like to believe what they want to be the(ir) truth. Thus politicians desire a certain level of 
revenues (which is likely to be higher for fragmented governments) and they are convinced to realize 
(at least) that revenue level. This conviction is built on arguments that support the achievement of this 
revenue level while other arguments that reject these beliefs are disregarded. 
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it is for fragmented governments to agree on necessary adjustments in the budget. 
Optimism then is a means to shift the burden of these adjustments to the future. 
Since Alesina & Drazen (1991) state that large coalitions find it particularly hard to 
reach agreements, politically fragmented governments can be expected to be more 
optimistic than single party governments.6 The introduction of NUMPAR may 
measure the effect of fragmentation on credibility. NUMPAR represents the 
Effective Number of Government Parties as introduced by Laakso & Taagepera 
(1979).7 Higher values of NUMPAR represent increases in fragmentation. As we 
assign lower credibility to higher fragmentation (Brück & Stephan, 2006), the 
expected coefficient of NUMPAR is negative. Yet credibility may not decrease 
linearly in the number of parties (Goeminne et al., 2008). Therefore, we also test for a 
possible non-linearity in the effect of fragmentation by including a squared term of 
NUMPAR. 
 
Third we take into account whether changes in the government affect credibility. 
Variable CHANGE is a dummy variable that has value 1 if the ideological 
composition of the cabinet has changed and value 0 if otherwise. The sign of this 
variable is a priori unknown. A positive coefficient would suggest that new 
governments aim to inspire confidence by building up credibility. A negative 
coefficient could be an indication that new governments have difficulties in meeting 
the objectives or that the budget balance is overestimated. This may reflect optimism 
by the new government and may have strategic goals, as better projections may 
smoothen a cabinet crisis.   
 
Like Pina & Venes (2011) we lag the political variables one year in order to capture 
the political characteristics of the governments at the time of making the forecast.  
 
Fourth, we are interested whether or not governments change their policy at election 
time. Questions like these are the central focus of electoral cycle models (Rogoff, 
1990). There is a lot of empirical evidence to support the idea that incumbents, 
motivated by their chances of re-election, change their policy before elections (e.g. 
Drazen et al., 2001). Buti & Van den Noord (2003) point to a revival of the political 
budget cycle in the EU after the run-up to EMU. Elections can be seen as a moment 
for voters to evaluate the current government‟s performance. The government thus 
may want to issue optimistic forecasts about the budget balance when elections come 
                                                 
6  As for the Weak Government Hypothesis, we do not expect an intention to overestimate to be present. 
7  The „effective number of  parties‟ is calculated as the inverse of  , where n is the number of  
parties in the government and pi is the party i‟s share in the total number of  seats. Size inequalities 
result in values of  the effective number of  parties that are lower than the actual number of  parties. 
Lower concentrations result in higher values and represent increases in fragmentation.
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near since these optimistic forecasts may voters make believe that the government is 
doing well. Or they may increase spending prior to elections and hide the emerging 
budget deficit from the electorate until after the elections (Brück & Stephan, 2006). 
Both situations suggests that forecasts may be more optimistic when elections are not 
on the horizon than when they are not. To capture this, like Brück & Stephan (2006), 
Pina & Venes (2011) or Strauch et al. (2004) we introduce dummies to test the impact 
of the presence of elections to credibility. ELECTION has value 1 in election years 
and 0 if other. Since we hypothesize that forthcoming elections induce governments 
to issue optimistic budget forecasts, a negative coefficient is expected. To test the 
degree of foresight of incumbents, we also introduce dummy variable 
PREELECTION that has value 1 in the year prior to elections and 0 if other. 
 
We also introduce some economic and budgetary control variables to the model. 
DEBT captures the general government gross debt expressed in percentage of GDP 
to capture the impact of the member states‟ budgetary situation (Beetsma et al., 2009). 
GROWTH reflects the projected economic growth. Here the percentage change of 
the expected growth of GDP on previous year‟s GDP is used. This variable controls 
for the possibility of greater optimism in economic good times (Annett, 2006; Pina & 
Venes, 2011 and Strauch et al., 2004). This variable may be used politically too since 
the pressure to plan substantial medium-term adjustments can be reduced by 
formulating overly-optimistic growth assumptions. This strategy allows governments 
to show favourable ex ante outcomes, while allowing them to blame poor ex post 
outcomes on the economy (Annett, 2006). Optimistic estimates of potential growth 
also make underlying balances look healthier, again leading to looser ex post fiscal 
policy evaluations. So, not only the expected growth of GDP can explain the 
credibility of fiscal policy, also the accuracy of these growth forecasts should be taken 
into account. Economic forecasts are crucial building blocks of budgetary 
projections. They determine the budgetary goals along with the tax codes and 
expenditure plans. By result, in the subsequent assessment of fiscal policy, the 
discrepancy between actual and projected economic growth has to be considered. 
Besides a political motivation, the inclusion of the prediction errors in economic 
activity to the model allows to control for the effects of unobserved macro-economic 
shocks. Since GDP forecasts are published simultaneously with the budget balance 
forecast, they both may share a common forecast bias caused by the business cycle 
(Brück & Stephan, 2006). Jonung & Larch (2006), Beetsma et al. (2009) and Moulin & 
Wierts (2006) find that growth projections incorporated in the EU Stability and 
Convergence Programs are on average too optimistic. Jonung & Larch (2006) show 
that optimism of the growth forecast has a measurable negative effect on budgetary 
outcomes. If real GDP growth is projected too high, this could contribute to a 
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widening of the gap between the planned and final outcomes. Moulin & Wierts 
(2006) find moreover that the tendency to overestimate GDP growth has been more 
pronounced in Member States with high initial deficits. To capture the impact of 
economic growth forecast accuracy, we introduce GROWTHGAP, that is the 
difference between the actual growth (in %) of the GDP and the planned growth (in 
%) of the GDP as mentioned in the Stability and Convergence Programs. 
Overestimated growth expectations may lead to overestimated budget balances, so a 
positive coefficient is expected.  
 
INSTITUT groups the institutional variables FED and FRI. FED is a dummy 
variable that takes value 1 if an EU member is federalised and 0 otherwise.8 
Federalism is a system in which the power to govern is shared between national and 
provincial/state governments. Although the operations of all levels of government 
are relevant to compliance with the SGP regulations, which refer to general 
government, in fact it is the central government that is responsible for compliance. 
SGP regulations do not take the existence of different levels of government into 
account. Without suitable regulation, entities of lower government levels thus could 
free-ride on the back of central governments. Therefore we expect that it is more 
difficult to get accurate projections in federalised than in a unitary states and thus a 
negative sign is expected. FRI takes into account the impact of fiscal rules and fiscal 
institutions.9 Marneffe et al. (2010), the European Commission (2011) and Beetsma et 
al. (2009) find that fiscal rules have some effect on fiscal balances in the euro zone. 
Annet (2006) finds that countries utilizing independent forecasts tend to have lower 
forecast errors. To test the impact of fiscal rules on credibility, we introduce the 
European Commission‟s (2011) Fiscal Rule Index that combines the strength and 
coverage of all rules in force.10 Stronger rules and institutions result in higher FRI. 
The sign of FRI is a priori unknown. On the one hand, stronger rules and better 
institutions may foster fiscal discipline. Better institutions may also be associated with 
more realistic and, therefore, less optimistic projections leading to ex-post better than 
projected results. In that case a positive sign could be expected. On the other hand 
plans may be distorted by the need to comply with ex-ante fiscal rules that require 
                                                 
8  FED is retrieved too from the Armingeon et al. (2011) Comparative Political Data Set III 1990-2009. 
9  “A fiscal rule is a permanent constraint on fiscal policy, defined in terms of  an indicator of  overall 
fiscal performance. These rules cover summary fiscal indicators, such as the government budget deficit, 
borrowing, debt, or major components thereof  – often expressed as a numerical ceiling or target, in 
proportion to GDP” (Kopits & Symansky, 1998; 2). 
10  The European Commission has constructed an index of strength of fiscal rules. This index captures 
information on (i) the statutory base of the rule, (ii) the body in charge of monitoring the respect of the 
rule, (iii) the body in charge of enforcement of the rule, and (iv) the enforcement mechanisms relating 
to the rule. Based on the strength index for each rule, a comprehensive time-varying Fiscal Rule Index 
(FRI) for each Member State was constructed that is calculated by summing up all fiscal rule strength 
indices in force in the respective Member State, weighted by the coverage of general government 
finances by the respective rule. 
Naert & Goeminne 19 
fiscal discipline only in terms of plans but not in terms of outcomes (Beetsma et al., 
2009). These ex-ante rules thus may institutionalize fiscal surprises by distorting the 
budgeting process (Inman, 1996). In particular, they may imply unrealistically 
disciplined fiscal plans, which then produce larger deviations of outcomes from the 
original plan (Beetsma et al., 2009), so a negative coefficient for FRI can be expected 
too. 
 
Finally, we add some dummy variables to the model to answer some specific 
questions. First we were interested if the economic and financial crisis had an impact 
on credibility. CRISIS is a vector of two year dummy variables that are introduced to 
take into account the exceptional circumstances resulting from the economic and 
financial crisis starting in 2008. Dummy variable Y2008 (Y2009) has value 1 in the 
year 2008 (2009) and 0 otherwise. A second question is whether credibility in the 10 
countries that joined the EU in 2004 and Romania and Bulgaria that joined the EU in 
2007 is similar to the remaining 15 countries. MEMBERS is a pair of dummy 
variables that is introduced to discriminate between these sets of member states. For 
the 10 (2) new members of 2004 (2007) we add dummy MEM10 (MEM02). These 
dummies have value 1 if a member state entered the EU in 2004 (2007) and 0 
otherwise. 
 
8. The results 
 
In Table 3 a number of regression results are shown which differ in a number of 
methodological characteristics. Depending on the estimation method, the regression 
above was slightly modified to meet the methodological needs of the different 
methods. In general the different estimations fit well with R² from 0.57 to 0.66. 
These values are highly comparable to those in the models of Brück & Stephan 
(2006). Before running our model, we tested for the existence of multicollinearity in 
our dataset by running a correlation analysis. The correlation matrix shown in Table 5 
in appendix indicates that none of the pair wise correlation coefficients are over the 
suggested threshold of |r|>0.80 (Gujarati, 2003; 359). To deal with potential 
endogeneity of projected GDP growth (GROWTH) and the economic growth 
forecast accuracy (GROWTHGAP) we instrument these variables and thus use an 
IV-approach.11 Sargan tests of the validity of the instruments indicate that they are 
                                                 
11   We instrument the projected GDP growth (GROWTH) and the economic growth forecast accuracy 
(GROWTHGAP) with real GDP growth, the one year lagged real GDP growth and the product of  
GROWTHGAP and real GDP growth. 
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valid.12 
 
Table 3 Estimation results 
 
Dependent var : Ei,t 1  2  3  4  
Intercept 
2.020 
(3.03) 
*** 
 
2.116 
(1.02) 
 1.856 
(0.82) 
 
-  
Lefti,t-1 
-1.136 
(-4.40) 
*** 
 
-1.096 
(-2.33) 
** -1.120 
(-2.42) 
** -0.818 
(-1.67) 
* 
Righti,t-1 
-0.686 
(-2.34) 
 
-0.504 
(-1.13) 
 -0.378 
(-0.93) 
 -0.305 
(-0.69) 
 
Numpari,t-1 
-0.063 
(-0.28) 
 
-0.192 
(-0.78) 
 -0.351 
(-1.15) 
 -0.666 
(-1.79) 
* 
 
Numpar²i,t-1 
0.019 
(0.81) 
 
0.032 
(1.21) 
 0.043 
(1.28) 
 0.079 
(1.82) 
* 
 
Changei,t-1 
0.346 
(1.22) 
 
0.179 
(0.51) 
 0.156 
(0.47) 
 0.149 
(0.61) 
 
Electioni,t 
-0.672 
(-3.09) 
*** 
 
-0.611 
(-2.37) 
** -0.507 
(-2.02) 
** -0.483 
(-1.80) 
* 
Preelectioni,t 
-0.128 
(-0.51) 
 
-0.003 
(-0.01) 
 -0.021 
(-0.07) 
 0.157 
(0.46) 
 
Debti,t 
-0.020 
(-3.52) 
*** 
 
-0.025 
(-0.82) 
 -0.017 
(-0.53) 
 -0.031 
(-0.96) 
 
Growthi,t 
-0.055 
(-0.45) 
 
0.030 
(0.15) 
 -0.007 
(-0.03) 
 -0.324 
(-1.61) 
 
Growthgapi,t 
0.290 
(3.80) 
*** 
 
0.292 
(3.38) 
*** 0.190 
(1.61) 
 0.297 
(2.85) 
*** 
Fedi,t 
0.121 
(0.365) 
 - 
 
- 
 
- 
 
FRIi,t 
0.053 
(0.48) 
 
0.148 
(0.45) 
 0.081 
(0.25) 
 -0.419 
(-2.42) 
** 
Mem02t 
-1.870 
(-3.35) 
*** 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
Mem10t 
0.046 
(0.13) 
 - 
 
- 
 
- 
 
Y2008i 
-0.780 
(-2.10) 
** 
 
-0.782 
(-1.91) 
* 
- 
 
- 
 
Y2009i 
-2.23 
(-3.63) 
*** 
 
-1.816 
(-2.32) 
** 
- 
 
- 
 
Ei,t-1 -  - 
 
- 
 0.453 
(4.45) 
*** 
Ei,t-2 -  - 
 
- 
 -0.095 
(-1.10) 
 
Fixed cross section effects No  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Fixed time effects No  No  Yes  Yes  
R² 0.571  0.605  0.659  -  
Adjusted R² 0.534  0.523  0.568  -  
N  220  220  220  142  
Period 1999-2009  1999-2009  1999-2009  2002-2009  
Cross-sections 26  26  26  24  
Sargan Chi² 
0.018 
(p=0.89) 
 
0.742 
(p=0.39) 
 
0.342 
(p=0.56) 
 
9.079 
(p=0.87) 
 
Note: Data for all EU member states, except for Greece; t-values between brackets (except for 
Sargan tests where p is presented); * significant at 10%, ** at 5% and *** at 1%.  
 
In column 1 the results of a simple IV-estimation using random effects are shown. 
The results give a first indication that politics matter in credibility. Ideology and the 
timing to elections seem to affect credibility. Yet this regression only takes into 
account a very restricted set of time and country specific characteristics. The results 
                                                 
12 The Sargan test assesses the validity of the instrumental variables. Therefore, we obtain the residuals of 
both estimations, regress them on all exogenous variables and obtain the number of observations (N) 
and the R² values. Then, N*R² yields the Sargan statistic. Under the null hypothesis that all instruments 
are exogenous, the Sargan statistic is Chi² distributed with R degrees of freedom (R being the number 
of instruments minus the number of endogenous parameters). If we fail to reject the hypothesis, which 
is the case in our model because both p-values exceed the value 0.10, the instruments are acceptable. 
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show that at the timing of the financial crisis credibility was worse than in the years 
before. Especially 2009, when the crisis reached its first peak, is characterised by a 
very substantial and significant shortfall of the actual balance from the originally 
planned balance. These first results also indicate that Bulgaria and Romania that 
joined in 2007 scored significant worse on credibility.  
 
Still, the analysis could be extended. Like Strauch et al. (2004) we add country fixed 
effects (column 2). Subsequently we add time fixed effects too (column 3) like in 
Brück & Stephan (2006) and Beetsma et al. (2009). These fixed effects symbolize 
country and time specific characteristics affecting credibility but possibly omitted in 
POLi,t-1, ECONi,t and INSTITUTi,t. The country dummy variables indicate whether 
there are country specific biases in forecasts.13 The year effects reflect biases common 
to all forecast errors in a given year.14 This could be due to forecasting behaviour or –
more likely– due to business cycles making the forecasts in some years more 
optimistic (or more pessimistic) than in others. The role of the time fixed effects may 
not be underestimated in the context of this paper. They capture what a group of 
member states has in common, leaving the political variables to capture the true 
political effects in each year (Brück & Stephan, 2006).  Overviewing the results in 
columns 1, 2 and 3, we could conclude that the results are highly comparable.  
 
Finally, in column 4 of Table 3 we conduct a further robustness check by presenting 
a model in which lagged dependent variables are included. Both the one and two year 
lagged values are introduced (respectively Ei,t-1 and Ei,t-2). On the one hand these 
lagged dependent variables may account for possible slow adjustments in credibility. 
Then a positive sign is expected, indicating that over- or underestimation of the 
budget balance is not magically resolved in the following years (Goeminne et al., 
2008). On the other hand, the lagged dependent variables may also control for the 
possibility that learning from past over- or underestimations makes governments 
more cautious in determining their new plans (Beetsma et al., 2009). Then a negative 
sign is expected. The sign of the lagged dependent variables thus is a priori unknown. 
Yet, the introduction of these lagged dependent variables forces us to introduce a 
new estimation method.  Indeed, the standard approaches to panel data analysis are 
inappropriate in a dynamic setting. In the presence of a lagged dependent variable 
both fixed and random effects estimators lead to biased and inconsistent estimation 
results (Baltagi, 1995).  To remove this bias, it is necessary to provide a valid set of 
instruments for the lagged dependent variable. Arellano & Bond (1991) offer a 
                                                 
13  The introduction of  fixed cross section effects requires the removal of  MEM02 and MEM10 from the 
model since the introduction of  the fixed cross section dummies lead to exact collinearity with MEM02 
and MEM10. The same is true for FED. 
14  When fixed year effects are estimated, Y2008 and Y2009 are inserted in the full set of  year dummies. 
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solution to this problem by treating the model as a system of equations (viz. one for 
each time period) and developing a Generalized Method of Moments estimator. We 
employ system GMM estimation (GMM-SYS; Arellano & Bover, 1995; Blundell & 
Bond, 1998) and introduce the two- and three-year lagged values of the dependent 
variables as instruments.15 Note that we use the one-step rather than the two-step 
variant of GMM-SYS. Although the latter is asymptotically more efficient, two-step 
GMM estimation is found to lead to significant downward bias in the estimated 
standard errors (Arellano & Bond, 1991; Blundell & Bond, 1998).  
 
Focusing the discussion of our results on column 4 of Table 3, fixed time and 
country effects as well as the impact of the lagged dependent variable are taken into 
account. The absence of a lagged dependent variable could lead to an omitted 
variable bias.16 Unlike in Beetsma et al. (2009), the lagged dependent variables affect 
credibility and indicate that models ignoring the lag in the dependent variable indeed 
may suffer from the omitted variable bias. The effect of the lagged dependent 
variable is positive, suggesting that adjustments in credibility only occur gradually. 
Each overestimation (underestimation) of the budget balance of 1% of GDP in the 
preceding year leads to an overestimation (underestimation) of 0.453% in the current 
year. This effect is restricted in time, since there is a significant effect of the one year 
lagged dependent variable, but not of the two year lagged variable.  
 
With respect to our central variables, the political variables, we find evidence that 
leftist governments are less credible than centre and rightist governments. This is in 
line with our expectations and thus suggests that leftist governments indeed are more 
optimistic about the budget balance. Also Brück & Stephan (2006) find a similar 
effect for eurozone economies, while Pina & Venes (2011) fail to find  a significant 
influence. It seems that the introduction of the lagged dependent variables reveals 
fragmentation effects. While in columns 1 to 3 no evidence was found of 
fragmentation effects, the results in column 4 allow to assign lower credibility to 
higher fragmentation. NUMPAR presents a significant negative coefficient which 
indicates that the number of parties in the government reduces credibility. Again this 
                                                 
15  The Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) was created at January 1, 1999. The members submitted 
their first stability programmes before the end of  1998. Since the data from these programmes is used 
to calcultate our dependent variable, there are no observations for our dependent variable prior to 
1999. Therefore the introduction of  the lagged values as instruments reduces our dataset to the period 
2002-2009. Also Bulgaria and Romania dissappear from the dataset since they joined EU in 2007, while 
our dataset is restricted to 2009. We prefer this method over the use of  figures from the convergence 
programmes as lagged values to make sure that our conclusions hold for the EMU members, being 
undisturbed by potential biases created by candidate EMU members. This is relevant since Strauch et al. 
(2004) show that the optimistic biases in forecasts of  budget surpluses and economic growth are more 
apparent during the convergence process. 
16  E.g. Brück & Stephan (2006) or Pina & Venes (2011) do not take into account possible lagged 
dependent variables effects. 
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is in line with Brück & Stephan (2006) who do and Pina & Venes (2011) who do not 
find that coalition governments present more optimistic budget deficit forecasts. Still 
in our model the effect of fragmentation on credibility is not linear since NUMPAR² 
presents a significant positive coefficient. Taken both effects together17 an increase in 
fragmentation reduces credibility until a government contains 4.19 effective parties.18 
Further increases in fragmentation than lead to an improvement in credibility. The 
negative effect of fragmentation on credibility thus is mainly driven by the “smaller” 
coalitions. “Larger” coalitions are more likely to follow fiscal policies representative 
of a larger part of the population (see Lijphart & Crepaz, 1991).  They might thus be 
less prone to threats of minor interest groups, limiting the need to present optimistic 
budgets. Note, moreover, that “an increase in the number of powerful groups [leads 
to] a dilution of power concentration” (Tornell & Lane, 1999; 32).  Hence, increases 
in the number of coalition partners reduce the power of each of these. This leads to 
lower levels of overspending when the number of coalition parties increases -thereby 
limiting the need to present optimistic budgets (Goeminne et al., 2008). Like Beetsma 
et al. (2009) we do not find evidence that there would be a difference in credibility 
when a new government is installed. In line with Brück & Stephan (2006) and Pina & 
Venes (2011) we find empirical evidence that elections matter. As expected, 
governments overestimate the budget balance in election years. They present 
optimistic projections prior to election years. By doing so, they mirror voters that 
they are doing well, while the results ex ante do not meet these projections.19 This 
suggests that the electoral benefits of presenting optimistic budget forecasts outreach 
the political costs of deviating from the fiscal plans. Finally, there is no evidence that 
governments are more credible in the year before elections.  
 
Regarding the economic variables, there is only evidence that overestimated GDP 
growth rates lead to overestimated budget balances. As in Brück & Stephan (2006) 
the coefficient of GROWTHGAP is positive, but smaller than 1, indicating that the 
overestimated growth rates are only partially reflected in overestimated budget 
balances, or that other variables, such as the political variables, explain credibility. As 
in Beetsma et al. (2009) there is no indication that the level of debt affects credibility. 
The same is true for the expected economic growth. 
 
                                                 
17  This can be calculated as following : NUMPAR*(-0.666) + NUMPAR²*(0.079). Numpar varies between 
1.99 and 9.07 (see Table 4 in appendix). 
18  It may sound unnatural that a government contains n number of  parties where n is a comma number. 
This is because we use the Effective Number of  Government Parties as introduced by Laakso & 
Taagepera (1979) in which size inequalities are taken into account (see footnote7). 
19  Strauch et al. (2004; p. 25; footnote 24) insinuate an opposite effect, yet their electoral effect does not 
fully pass the robustness check. 
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With respect to the impact of fiscal rules, FRI presents a significant and negative 
coefficient. This suggests that plans may be distorted by the need to comply with ex-
ante fiscal rules that require fiscal discipline only in terms of plans but not in terms of 
outcomes. In fact, this is the case for the Stability and Convergence Programs 
(Beetsma et al., 2009). These ex-ante rules allow governments to present 
unrealistically disciplined fiscal plans that result in ex-post larger deviations of 
outcomes from these original plans. 
 
9. Conclusions 
 
In this paper we present the results of an analysis into the credibility of fiscal policies 
in 26 EU Member States. We offer indicators for this credibility and present the 
determining factors of credibility. As for the measurement of credibility we construct 
indicators that focus on the difference between the actual budget balance in year t 
and the budget balances that were targeted in previous years for year t.  Regardless of 
the indicator chosen (E or ME) the same conclusions can be drawn. On an 
aggregated level the credibility of fiscal policies seems to evolve with the business 
cycle : in good times credibility is higher than in bad times. On a country level the 
worst results are to be found in peripheral EU countries that also were late joiners 
such as Bulgaria, Romania, Portugal and Lithuania. The best performing countries 
also belong to the periphery and the group of late joiners with the exception of 
Luxembourg : Estonia, Cyprus, Finland and Czech Republic. The EU core countries 
are all to be found in the middle range of the standing. 
 
When explaining the differences by political, economic and institutional variables, our 
results suggest that political factors affect the credibility of fiscal policy properly. 
While Beetsma et al. (2009 ) judge the role for political factors to be rather limited, 
our empirical analyses suggest that its role may not be dismissed. Political 
determinants affect the credibility of fiscal policy properly. Both ideology and 
fragmentation define credibility in a significant way. There is also evidence of a 
political business cycle effect. Governments overestimate the budget balance in 
election years and thus mislead voters pretending that they are doing better than they 
actually doing. Besides political determinants, the planning of the budget also 
depends strongly on the projections made of economic growth. Overestimated 
(underestimated) GDP growth rates lead to partially overestimated (underestimated) 
budget balances. The results also show that more (fiscally) centralised member states 
perform better and that adjustments in credibility only occur gradually.    
 
What do we learn from these results? They may raise the question whether it would 
not be better to bind the hands of politicians by putting them under the constraints 
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of rules or even by handing over the autonomy of policy making to a non-political 
institution. Indeed, the optimism bias of official deficit forecasts could be tackled by 
assigning the task of forecasting to an independent authority. There seems to be a 
consensus in the academic world that curtailing politicians is a good method to 
establish credibility in the field of monetary policy, as well as in the field of regulatory 
policy (e.g. Debrun et al., 2009; Gilardi, 2002; Kydland & Prescott, 1977). Concerning 
fiscal policy academics have been less outspoken. The reason could be that fiscal 
policy contrary to monetary or regulatory policy is besides being technical also highly 
distributive. Income and wealth redistribution creates winners and losers, 
necessitating democratic handling by elected parliaments and governments. 
Nevertheless a case can be made for devolving some part of fiscal agencies that 
themselves are entrusted with powers in executing fiscal policy. The policy making 
powers to independent fiscal agencies, although it never has been tried in practice. A 
further shift away from discretion towards rules seems to be warranted by the 
difficulties that many governments seem to have in dealing with their budget deficits. 
That is why the proposals of Calmfors (2011 & 2011) and Wyplosz (2005) should 
receive renewed attention by the academic world and by policy makers. These 
authors search for ways to take discretion, leading to deficit bias, out of the hands of 
politicians without endangering the accountability of fiscal policy. Their proposals are 
a careful mixture of decisions that can be taken by government and decisions that 
better can be delegated to independent fiscal agencies. These set-ups take advantage 
of the improved academic insights into the cyclical and structural behaviour of the 
budget.  
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Appendices 
 
Table 4 Descriptive statistics and datasources 
 
 Mean Median Max. Min. Std. Dev. Source 
Credibility (Ei,t) -0.31 0.00 5.00 -7.70 2.15 1 
Leftist government parties (Left) 0.29 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.45 2 
Rightist government parties (Right) 0.48 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.50 2 
Effective Number of Government Parties (Numpar) 3.96 3.71 9.07 1.99 1.41 2 
Government change (Change) 0.27 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.45 2 
Elections 0.24 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.43 2 
Preelections 0.26 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.44 2 
Debt 46.75 47.10 116.10 3.70 25.25 1 
Growth 2.84 2.75 9.00 -5.00 2.25 1 
Growth gap -0.49 0.08 5.00 -13.00 2.80 1 
Fiscal centralisation 58.59 55.50 100.00 27.30 15.01 2 
Federalism 0.12 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.32 2 
 
1 : own calculations on data retrieved from Eurostat 
2 : Armingeon et al., 2011 
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Table 5 Correlation matrix 
 
 Left Right Numpar Change Election Preelection Debt Growth Growthgap Fiscentr Fed Y08 Y09 MEM02 MEM10 
Left 1.00 -0.61 -0.06 -0.04 0.00 -0.02 0.05 -0.04 0.00 -0.09 -0.11 -0.03 -0.02 -0.12 0.05 
Right  1.00 0.06 0.10 -0.07 0.05 -0.14 -0.03 -0.08 0.19 -0.13 0.04 0.06 0.02 0.02 
Numpar   1.00 -0.09 0.04 -0.05 0.01 -0.02 0.01 -0.01 0.06 -0.02 -0.01 -0.03 0.00 
Change    1.00 -0.19 0.18 -0.01 0.06 0.05 -0.07 -0.01 0.10 -0.09 -0.03 0.07 
Election     1.00 -0.32 -0.01 0.09 0.08 -0.04 0.05 0.01 -0.09 0.03 -0.04 
Preelection      1.00 0.04 -0.09 -0.02 -0.02 0.04 0.03 0.03 -0.04 -0.01 
Debt       1.00 -0.21 -0.02 -0.17 0.36 -0.07 0.00 -0.22 -0.32 
Growth        1.00 0.86 0.13 -0.10 -0.10 -0.72 -0.01 0.11 
Growthgap         1.00 0.07 0.04 -0.26 -0.61 -0.10 -0.06 
Fiscentr          1.00 -0.40 0.00 -0.04 0.10 0.12 
Fed           1.00 -0.04 -0.01 -0.07 -0.24 
Y08            1.00 -0.12 0.11 0.09 
Y09             1.00 0.13 0.10 
MEM02              1.00 -0.10 
MEM10               1.00 
 
